EU Sport Diplomacy: An Idea Whose Time Has Nearly Come

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Abstract
The EU is often characterized as an economic giant but a political dwarf. In recognition of the need to develop its diplomatic persona, it is increasingly deploying soft power. Since the adoption of the sports competence in the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has considered the potential of sport to assist with the amplification of foreign policy messages. However, unlike many nation-states, it has not yet developed a sport diplomacy strategy, although the adoption of one is being discussed at ministerial level. Employing Kingdon’s multiple streams framework, this article explains how solutions have become joined to problems and that increasingly favourable political forces have opened a policy window through which the first ever EU sport diplomacy strategy should pass. However, the article also urges caution on policy entrepreneurs by advising on the circumstances in which Kingdon’s three streams will couple and a strategy emerge.

Keywords: EU sport diplomacy; article 165 TFEU; Kingdon; multiple streams framework

Introduction
Across the world, states are increasingly coming to the realization that sport should feature in their diplomatic toolkits. The universal appeal of sport offers a generally low-cost and low-risk means through which a state can explore the cultivation of new relations between estranged states. It can be employed to share that state’s values with other countries and be used to enhance its international brand with a view to leveraging new political and economic opportunities such as development, peace, security, trade and tourism goals. As an international organization comprised of nation-states, some of whom have developed their own national sport diplomacy strategies, the EU has struggled to conceptualize how sport can be deployed as part of its wider foreign policy.¹ The entry into force of Article 165 TFEU in 2009 offered the EU the opportunity to reassess this with the third paragraph inviting the EU and the Member States to ‘foster cooperation with third countries’ through sport. Meeting in Brussels in May 2021, the Council of Sports Ministers held a policy debate on the development of an EU sport diplomacy strategy. With only a few dissenting ministerial voices, the EU stands tantalisingly close to the adoption of such a strategy. However, without tactical astuteness, the policy window will close. Employing Kingdon’s multiple streams framework (MSF), and responding to the title of the opening chapter of his book – How Does an Idea’s Time Come? – this article explores how the problem and policy streams coupled thus pushing the issue onto the EU’s agenda for political discussion. It sets out the conditions necessary for such a strategy to be approved and in doing so it adds to Kingdon’s focus on policy entrepreneurs and policy window ‘spillover’.

¹This paper employs the term ‘sport diplomacy’ as favoured at official EU institutional level. It is acknowledged that this practice is also referred to as ‘sports diplomacy’ (Murray, 2018) and ‘sport and diplomacy’ (Rofe, 2018).
I. The Three Faces of Sport Diplomacy

It is no great insight to observe that within the international system, states attempt to shape the behaviour and preferences of others. This can be achieved through coercion, manipulation, bribery or attraction. As Nye claimed, ‘[a] country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, and/or aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness’ (Nye, 2008: p. 94). Commonly, this is referred to as ‘soft’ or ‘smart’ power as it rests on the ability to co-opt people rather than coerce them and their governments (Nye, 1990, 2004, 2008, 2021). Soft power therefore falls within the remit of public diplomacy, a term referring to the process of states and international organizations attempting to manage the international environment and achieve foreign policy goals by engaging foreign publics (Dubinsky, 2019: p. 156). In addition to listening, advocacy, exchange diplomacy and international broadcasting, cultural diplomacy is frequently employed for engaging these publics (Cull, 2008; Cummings, 2003), with related diplomatic techniques being observed in the areas of art and literature (Barnhisel, 2015), music (Dunkel & Nitzsche, 2018), cuisine (Nirwandy & Azran Awang, 2014), beer (Schweitzer, 2018) and archaeology (Luke & Kersel, 2013). Sport diplomacy is another such branch, but just as public diplomacy presents several faces, so too does sport diplomacy.

Its first, and most familiar, face is ‘traditional’ sport diplomacy. For many years, states have co-opted sport to amplify foreign policy and diplomatic messages. Oft-cited examples are Hitler’s staging of the 1936 Berlin Olympics (Krüger & Murray, 2003) and the ‘ping-pong’ inspired rapprochement between President Nixon and Chairman Mao in 1972 (Xu, 2008). The state has also employed sport to signal its displeasure with its counterparts, so sporting boycotts, such as those at the Moscow (1980) and Los Angeles (1984) Olympic Games, have become a feature of the sport diplomacy landscape (Beacom, 2012: pp. 113–37; Gomez, 2018: pp. 169–84). Sport has even been used as a proxy to play out geo-political rivalries as witnessed by the ‘blood in the water’ encounter between the water polo teams of Hungary and the USSR in 1956 (Rinehart, 1996). These ‘traditional’ sport diplomacy actions have tended to be ‘sporadic, opportunistic and, arguably, somewhat clumsy’ and the results have been difficult to determine (Murray, 2018: p. 61). Accordingly, in recent years some states have attempted to act in a more strategic and nuanced manner, and this has modernised sport diplomacy.

At one level, ‘modern’ sport diplomacy could be considered merely a more regular and strategic version of its ‘traditional’ sibling. Take for example the systematic use of sport by China to re-brand via ‘mega-event diplomacy’, ‘stadium building diplomacy’ and the enormous investments made into domestic and overseas sports, notably football (Xu, 2008; Xue et al., 2019). Consider also the use of soft power and cultural diplomacy in the context of opening ceremonies of Olympic Games (Arning, 2013). However, in another context, modern sport diplomacy feels different. It draws in a wider number of actors beyond the traditional diplomat and politician including amateur and professional sportspersons (‘diplomats in tracksuits’), sports clubs, governing bodies and civil society actors. It refers to the ‘conscious, strategic and regular’ use of sport by the state to build long-term mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries and societies, particularly where relations have become estranged (Murray, 2018: p. 94). Modern sport diplomacy
extends the appeal of a nation’s people and culture to third countries through the cultivation of people-to-people links with grassroots initiatives becoming increasingly prominent (Garamvölgyi et al., 2020).

A third face of sport diplomacy can be observed – ‘sport-as-diplomacy’. Here, private sports bodies, as opposed to public bodies, harness the appeal of sport as a means of pursuing their interests in the international arena (Beacom, 2012, p. 224). For example, through the allocation of major sporting events, sports bodies can leverage influence in national capitals and seek assurances, sometimes even enshrined in law, about the protection of key interests such as the preservation of the autonomy and specificity of sport. The existence of so-called ‘Olympic Law’ within national legal systems highlights the diplomatic power of the sports movement (James & Osborn, 2011, 2016). Similarly, the reference to the ‘specific nature of sport’ contained in Article 165 TFEU reflects a complex constellation of forces, but one significant factor was the diplomatic campaign led by the IOC (García & Weatherill, 2012). ‘Sport-as-diplomacy’ offers the EU sporting partners already well versed in the ways of international diplomacy and it also presents potentially fruitful avenues for the EU and Member States to seek advances in their own interests, such as embedding a human-rights focus within the context of the staging of major sporting events (Duval, 2021).²

II. The Multiple Streams Framework

Within the ‘garbage can’ (Cohen et al., 1972) of public policy options, sport is all too often regarded as a solution looking for a problem. For example, in the UK the then Prime Minister Blair declared that his government’s sports policy ‘is not just a sports policy, it is a health policy and education policy, an anti-crime policy and an anti-drugs policy’ (Lewis & Taylor, 2021: p. 107). Despite being constrained by the principle of conferral enshrined in Article 5 TEU, the EU has also viewed sport as a vehicle through which goals in related policy areas can be achieved. Even though at the time not possessing any powers in the field of sports policy, a 1995 study on The Impact of European Union Activities on Sport conducted by Coopers and Lybrand for the European Commission connected sport to a bewilderingly large range of EU competences (Coopers & Lybrand, 1995), some of which the EU pursued a constitutionally questionable interest in (Parrish, 2003a, 2003b).

Restraint was imposed on the Commission by the Court of Justice. In UK v Commission, the UK, concerned at competence creep, successfully applied for annulment of certain grants for European projects seeking to overcome social exclusion on the basis that the Commission lacked competence.³ A number of sports programmes financed by the Commission were either abandoned or connected to policy areas in which the EU was competent. Accordingly, 2004 was designated the European Year of Education Through Sport, education policy being a competence of the Union.⁴

²For example, in January 2021, the 27 EU ministers responsible for sport signed a letter addressed to European Commissioner Gabriel requesting that human rights are ensured in all countries organizing major international sporting events both within and outside the EU.
The adoption of Articles 6 and 165 TFEU in 2007 (the sports competence) relieved the need for these constitutional gymnastics, although the fourth paragraph of Article 165 limited EU action in the field of sport merely to the adoption of incentive measures and recommendations, whilst excluding harmonizing measures. Nevertheless, whilst possessing limited legislative potential, Article 165 contained a competence ripe for political exploitation. Although attracting little attention, its third paragraph provided that the EU and Member States ‘shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the field of education and sport’. Although by no means an explicit invitation to develop a sport diplomacy strategy, creative reading of the third paragraph opened the door in this direction. However, the mere existence of Article 165(3) cannot alone account for why sport diplomacy’s time has come.

Kingdon’s multiple streams framework provides a useful starting point for the exploration of this question (Kingdon, 2014). Kingdon conceptualizes the policy process as consisting of three largely independent streams: a problem, policy and politics stream. Within the problem stream, key indicators, focusing events and feedback alert policymakers to issues requiring attention. However, some problems ‘fade’ and policy actions never see the light of day (Kingdon, 2014, p. 103). In that regard, Knaggaård (2015) identified the role problem brokers play in framing problems and Herweg et al. (2015) highlighted the importance of political salience to problem definition. Such refinements to Kingdon’s work reveal the importance of agency within the problem stream as problems are not seen as ‘objective facts but rather as social constructs’ (Weible & Sabatier, 2018: p. 22).

Within the policy stream, certain proposed solutions to the aforementioned problems are pushed from within policy communities. These policy communities are specialists in a given policy area and include civil servants, academics, consultants and interest groups who generate alternatives and proposals in what Kingdon likened to a ‘primeval soup’ (Kingdon, 2014, pp. 116–144). The structure of the policy communities and external influences shape the content and strength of the proposed solution. Kingdon advanced criteria for the survival of solutions, including its technical feasibility, whether the proposed solution is compatible with the values of the policy community, its cost and the public’s receptiveness to the proposed solution (Kingdon, 2014: pp. 131–9).

Finally, the political stream is the location for adopting a particular course of action. It is affected by three elements with not all needing to be in alignment. First, policymakers sense the national mood and tend to back solutions that lie within the parameters of that mood. Second, the political stream is sensitive to organized political forces in which political parties and interest groups mobilize to support or oppose certain solutions. The government is the third component of the political stream, although Herweg et al. (2015) have also stressed the importance of political parties in parliamentary systems. Composition changes within government and parliament, or even turnover of key personnel such as ministers, can promote or close off certain courses of action. Agendas are also significantly affected by the drawing of jurisdictional boundaries and by turf wars (Kingdon, 2014, pp. 145–64). Whereas within the policy stream it is the power of persuasion that structures success, within the political stream it is bargaining and negotiation.

Kingdon asserts that an issue arrives onto the policy agenda and action is taken when the three streams couple and a policy window is opened where ‘a problem is recognized, a solution is developed and available in the policy community, a political change makes the time right for a policy change, and potential constraints are not severe’ (Kingdon, 2014,
In a further refinement to his framework, Herweg et al. (2015, pp. 444–5) distinguish between an ‘agenda window’ and a ‘decision window’. The first refers to the coupling process resulting in agenda-setting whereas the second captures the decision-making stage.

Some policy windows open predictably, for example due to a scheduled renewal of a programme, whereas others open less predictably. Regardless, those who advocate a particular course of action need to be prepared to take advantage of an open window to facilitate the coupling of the streams and to secure adoption of their favoured solution. These so-called policy entrepreneurs can be politicians, civil servants, lobbyists, academics, journalists and so forth, with success being connected with the level of access they have to decision-makers, their entrepreneur qualities and strategies they employ and the available resources.

Kingdon’s work was focused on the US federal government, with decision-making within it characterized as ‘organized anarchy’ (Kingdon, 2014, p. 86), a term he borrowed from Cohen et al. (1972). This alerts us to the somewhat chaotic nature of agenda setting processes in which the three streams have a life of their own and preferences are ill-defined, organizational processes misunderstood and participation within the streams fluid. These characteristics resonate with EU processes and have become termed institutional ambiguities (Ackrill & Kay, 2011, p. 75). For example, within the European Commission, even though each DG has responsibility for a discrete field, policy areas cannot be so easily compartmentalised, and issues overlap with other DGs with no clear hierarchy prevailing.

This ambiguity heightens the prospect for what Kingdon termed ‘spillover’ (Kingdon, 2014, p. 190), a concept familiar to scholars of European integration theory (Haas, 1968). Spillover refers to a process in which the appearance of a window for one subject increases the probability that a window will open for another. Principles from one policy area are then imported into a related area.

Originally devised in the 1980s to account for agenda setting within US politics, the MSF has since widened its geographical appeal. Jones et al. (2016) surveyed the literature between 2000 and 2013 and discovered that Kingdon’s framework was applied to study 65 countries across 22 different policy areas. Its application to EU public policy has been relatively recent with a number of papers identifying the need to adapt the framework to the specificities of EU policymaking.

Amongst the first to apply the framework was Zahariadis (2008) who argued that EU policy outputs are the result of the interaction of the streams. Since then, the framework has been applied to a number of EU policies including: sugar (Ackrill & Kay, 2011), quality of life indicators (Bache, 2013), cohesion (Becker, 2019; Engl & Evrard, 2020), economic policy (Copeland & James, 2014; Saurugger & Terpen, 2016; Schön-Quinlivan & Scipioni, 2017), banking (De Rynck, 2016), data protection (Goyal et al., 2021), natural gas regulation (Herweg, 2016), children’s rights policy (Iusmen, 2012), counter-terrorism (Kaunert & Léonard, 2019), digital tax proposals (Lips, 2020), biofuels policy (Palmer, 2015), and tax avoidance (Roland, 2020).

The application of the MSF to sport policy is quite rare and almost unheard of in terms of developments at EU level. Houlihan (2005) highlighted its general utility to sports studies with the framework being applied to skiing (Bergsgard, 2000), school sports (Houlihan & Green, 2006), local authority sport policy in the UK (King, 2009), the

With such growing interest in the application of the MSF to both the EU policy process and to sports policy generally, it is somewhat surprising that Kingdon’s work has not featured more prominently in the EU sports policy literature, although Parrish (2003a), García (2007) and García and Weatherill (2012) have discussed its relevance.

### III. The Problem Stream: Europe and the World and the Status of EU Sports Policy

The EU has struggled to match its ‘market power’ (Damro, 2012) with a strong ‘diplomatic persona’ separate from those evident in national capitals (Hill & Wallace, 1979; p. 47). By the early 1990’s, Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens characterized the EU as ‘an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm’ (The New York Times, 1991). Since then, the EU has expanded its diplomatic scope by developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and post-Lisbon, a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and a European External Action Service (EEAS). In 2016 it adopted a global strategy for the EU’s foreign and security policy (EEAS, 2016). The EU is increasingly practising public diplomacy, as evidenced by the development of an external dimension to its cultural policy (Carta & Higgot, 2020; Raj Isar, 2015) and the projection of soft power through its educational diplomacy, embodied in its Erasmus+ Programme (Ferreira-Pereira & Mourato Pinto, 2021). It can therefore be observed that the EU is adding ‘normative power’ to its diplomatic repertoire (Manners, 2002) yet its perception by foreign publics, whilst generally favourable, is still in need of work with Brexit, the rise of populism, negative views of third-country trade rules and the EU’s Covid-19 response diminishing the EU’s brand.

The role of sport as an expression of EU normative power is largely under-explored, although García and Meier (2017) and Geeraert and Drieskens (2017) did consider the exercise of the EU’s market and normative power in the context of global sports regulation and governance. Deploying sport as part of the EU’s public diplomacy is attractive. Sport is one of the EU’s most prominent sources of attraction for external audiences (European Commission, 2016, p. 8) and it accounts for 2.12 per cent of total EU GDP and 2.72 per cent of EU employment (European Commission, 2018a, p. 9). By not developing a sport diplomacy strategy, the EU is falling behind its global competitors who have already come to the realization that sport has a place in the diplomatic toolkit.

Following 9/11, the US established *SportsUnited*, the US sport diplomacy division with the task of reforging the image of the US in estranged cultures and societies in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Now called the Sports Diplomacy Division, it is housed within the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs which itself sits within the Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs branch of the US Department of State. The strategy focusses on people-to-people engagements, for example within the context of sports exchanges, sports envoys and sports mentoring (Lecrom & Ferry, 2017). A 2013 evaluation undertaken by the US Department of State reported the programmes ‘had a profound
impact on respondents’ (US Department of State, 2013, p. 4) with Murray claiming that
the US example reveals that ‘the simplicity and power of sport to boost a nation’s diplo-
macy is self-evident’ (Murray, 2018; p. 102). The people-to-people focus is also largely
favoured by Australia who first established a sports diplomacy strategy in 2015 (Mur-

China’s deployment of public diplomacy is extensive and sport features heavily in its
image building strategy through, for example, the hosting of major sporting events,
funding for elite-level sport, and the funding of overseas sports stadia (Kobierecki, 2020,
pp. 119–27). Japan’s approach is ‘aimed at creating positive images of Japan abroad,
boosting the overall Japanese brand, and encouraging a deeper understanding of Japan’
(Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020). The staging of London 2012 offered the UK
sport diplomacy opportunities (Grix & Houlihan, 2013), but less visible people-to-people
sports programmes channelled through the British Council, such as Premier Skills and Try
Rugby, are a key feature of its approach.

The issue for the EU extends beyond a mere ‘fear of missing out’. A number of EU
Member States have taken steps at formulating sport diplomacy strategies and without
some level of coordination, the collective voice of the EU risks being fragmented.
Equally, many states who are developing national strategies are beginning to see merit
in EU action as a means of complementing such strategies and securing efficiency gains.
The most well-developed national strategy in the EU is that of France with its approach,
led by an Ambassador for Sport located in the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs,
aimed at economic growth and developing French influence globally (ISCA, undated,
p. 8). Other Member States are also developing strategies including Spain (Ministerio
de Asuntos Exteriores, Unión Europea y Cooperación, 2019), Hungary (Garamvölgyi
&Dócz, 2021), and Croatia (Central State Office for Sport, Republic of Croatia, 2019).

A second dimension to the problem stream, and one highlighting the role of the ‘prob-
lem broker’ (Knaggaård, 2015) is the status of sport policy within the EU’s framework of
competences. As Articles 6 and 165 TFEU only provide for actions to support, coordinate
or supplement the actions of the Member States, sport policy is retained as a Member
State competence. In the immediate aftermath of Lisbon, sport was granted a very limited
range of powers and budgetary options. This contributed to sport’s low status in EU
policy and it resulted in it being buffeted by activity in other policy subsystems, notably
those involving competition law, free movement and audio-visual (Cattaneo & Parrish, 2020). Sport diplomacy offered EU sport policy the impetus it needed.

Within the Commission, responsibility for sport lies with the Directorate General for
Education, Youth, Sport and Culture (DG EAC) with the specialist Sport Unit sitting
within it. The Sport Unit has sought to enhance the status and budget of sport and has
achieved one notable success – the inclusion of sport within the EU’s Erasmus+ pro-
gramme in 2014. Here, the Commission framed potential sport initiatives as part of wider
EU concerns (García et al., 2018), a strategy DG EAC also pursued to enhance the status
of EU cultural policy (Littoz-Monnet, 2012). DG EAC therefore sought to further en-
hance the status of another aspect of its portfolio (sport) by connecting it to the EU’s
global strategy which embraces a ‘whole-of-EU’ focus drawing in a range of policy areas
previously obscured on the diplomat’s radar (Barbé & Morillas, 2019, p. 762). To achieve
this, softening up was required.
IV. The Policy Stream: Softening Up

The above assessment reveals that although sport is not of primary importance to EU policymakers, it possesses strong potential to be coupled with the problem stream thus increasing prospects for action. For this to occur, policy entrepreneurs needed to convince policymakers of the value of sport. Following the entry into force of Article 165 in 2009, the Commission’s Communication on Sport committed to ‘identify the scope for international cooperation in the field of sport’ (European Commission, 2011, p. 14). Having done so, DG EAC commenced a softening up strategy, the contours of which were shaped by the EU’s ‘Better Regulation’ agenda (Garben, 2020). Central to the Commission’s approach was establishing the credibility of sport diplomacy through expert endorsement which would then be used to couple with the politics stream in order to secure policy action and funding.

Within this softening up strategy, the role of the policy entrepreneur is highlighted. In 2015, the new European Commissioner for Education and Culture, Tibor Navracsics, used the review of EU external relations carried out by the EU’s High Representative of the EU, Federica Mogherini (Barrinha, 2016) to advance sport diplomacy. He established a High-Level Group on Sport Diplomacy composed of academics, former athletes, representatives of major sport organizations and think-thanks as well as politicians having exercised high-level responsibilities in the field of sport. In June 2016, the High-Level Group made a series of recommendations on the location of sport within the EU’s external relations policies, how sport can promote EU values in the context of major events and how it can cultivate an EU organizational culture of sport diplomacy (European Commission, 2016).

To keep sport diplomacy on the EU’s agenda and to sensitise the relevant institutional actors in the EU, DG EAC organized two high-level political conferences on sport diplomacy (06/12/16 & 06/12/17) which highlighted to members of EU institutions, national diplomats and senior members of sports bodies the opportunities offered by sport diplomacy. To further strengthen the evidence-base, DG EAC commissioned the report, Sport diplomacy: Identifying good practices (European Commission, 2018b) and the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) financially supported three Erasmus+ Collaborative Partnerships projects exploring the development of EU sport diplomacy.5

V. The Political Stream: Sport Diplomacy on the Political Agenda

In November 2016, just five months after the publication of the report of the High-Level Group, the first significant political steps were taken towards establishing EU sport diplomacy with the adoption Council Conclusions on Sport Diplomacy under the auspices of the Slovak Presidency (Council of the European Union, 2016). The Conclusions invited the Member States and the Commission to take steps to integrate sport into the EU’s external relations dimension. In requesting that ‘sport diplomacy remains on the EU political agenda’, the Council acknowledged the early stages of this new area and requested that a further evidence base ‘could contribute to the preparation of the strategic approach to sport diplomacy in the framework of the EU’ (Council of the European Union, 2016, p. 4).

5The three Erasmus+ projects are: Grassroots Sport Diplomacy (2018–19), Promoting a Strategic Approach to EU Sport Diplomacy (2019–21) and Towards an EU Sport Diplomacy (2020–21).
Following the Slovak Conclusions, in 2017, sport diplomacy was recognized as a ‘priority’ theme of EU sports policy with the adoption of the Council Resolution on the European Union Work Plan for Sport 2017–2020 (Council of the European Union, 2017). At paragraph 12, sport diplomacy was established as an EU priority theme and at 18 the Council requested that the Commission ‘ensure a follow-up of the work done by previous High-Level Groups... on Sport and Diplomacy’. The Resolution acknowledged, at paragraph 8, ‘the need to cooperate with third countries, in particular candidate countries and potential candidates to the EU, to promote European values through sport diplomacy ...’.

By establishing sport diplomacy as a priority theme, the Resolution added political and administrative impetus to the issue by informing the EU institutions on initiatives in other policy areas impacting on sport, informing the work of Commission and Council working parties and expert groups, stimulating the sharing of best-practice initiatives, informing national sport diplomacy strategies, providing logistical and technical support for sport diplomacy initiatives, and facilitating dialogue on sport via the bi-lateral and multi-lateral dialogue between the EU and sport including dialogue within the context of the European Sport Forum and the European Week of Sport. The Conclusions were adopted almost simultaneously with the Council Conclusions on the Global Strategy on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (EEAS, 2016), further highlighting the spillover potential between policy fields.

Being designated a priority theme placed sport diplomacy at the heart of the EU’s rolling Presidency agenda and, according to the Commissioner Navracsics, established it as a ‘permanent pillar of EU sports policy’ (EOSE, 2018). From January to June 2018, the Bulgarian Presidency of the EU established the promotion of ‘European values through sport’ as a priority theme. A high-level discussion, led by Commissioner Navracsics, took place at the EU Sport Forum in Sofia in March 2018. In April 2018, the Council adopted Conclusions on Promoting the Common Values of the EU Through Sport, including at paragraph 28, the invitation to the Commission to ‘... include sport as part of external relations’.

Sport diplomacy was retained in the EU Work Plan for Sport 2021–24 (Council of the European Union, 2020) and between January and June 2021, the Portuguese Presidency of the EU prioritized sport diplomacy and held a Council policy debate on the subject in May 2021 and staged a two-day sport diplomacy conference in Lisbon in June.

Priority status has also opened EU budgetary opportunities for sport diplomacy initiatives at both EU institutional and non-governmental levels, for example by unlocking access for sport diplomacy initiatives in the Erasmus+ Programme and other funds including European structural and investment funds. Nevertheless, in order to facilitate the participation of non-EU countries in EU-funded sport diplomacy initiatives, certain administrative amendments were required. The Commission secured amendments to the EU’s Erasmus+ eligibility criteria to facilitate the participation of non-EU ‘Partner Countries’ in the programme (totalling 21 countries from the Western Balkans, Eastern Partnership, South-Mediterranean and Russian Federation) and it secured amendment to the eligibility rules for participation in the annual European Week of Sport which from 2018 was extended to include the participation of the Western Balkan and Eastern Partnership states – the ‘Beyond Borders’ initiative.

Largely absent from discussion within the political stream has been the European Parliament, although it was involved in the extension of EU financing instruments to third
countries (Mittag & Naul, 2021). In 2021, the Parliament acknowledged its limited role in the development of an EU sport diplomacy strategy with its call to ‘play a more active role in sports diplomacy’ (European Parliament, 2021).

VI. The Future of EU Sport Diplomacy: Towards a Strategy

EU sport diplomacy is an idea whose time has nearly come. Article 165(3) resolves competence questions, the Commission has softened up the political stream, the Slovak Conclusions have added political impetus and budgetary blockages have been removed. Yet, a strategy is not in place, although a series of ad hoc practical initiatives suggest progress. In November 2017, for the first time, sport was integrated into the EU–China High Level People to People Dialogue (HPPD) and in July 2018, the EU and Japan launched the EU–Japan Policy Dialogue on Education, Youth and Sport which included programmes involving sport designed to foster people-to-people contacts within the Japan–EU Strategic Partnership Agreement. The Commission has also taken steps to strengthen diplomatic relations with sports organizations, for example through its 2018 Co-operation Arrangement with UEFA (European Commission, 2018c). The annex to the agreement included reference to the potential of the UEFA EURO 2020 (staged in 2021) in terms of portraying ‘a positive image of Europe and its common values’ (para. 3.1.3).

These initiatives reveal an approach in need of identity and strategy. The development of an EU sport diplomacy strategy is the next stage of the process, and one being discussed within the political stream. In May 2021, sports ministers met in Brussels for a policy debate on the need for such a strategy. The accompanying background paper invited the ministers to consider the relevance of EU cultural and educational diplomacy as a ‘blueprint’ for an EU sport diplomacy strategy (Council of the European Union, 2021, p. 6). This highlights the relevance of Kingdon’s notion of spillover in which the appearance of a policy window for one subject increases the probability that a window will open for another similar subject and that principles established in one area will be imported into another (Kingdon, 2014, p. 190). Observing the recent development of EU cultural policy and diplomacy, it can be hypothesised that for spillover to occur from existing to emerging EU policy areas, such as sport diplomacy, a number of conditions need to be met.

The New Policy Area Does Not Raise Competence Issues

The EU is competent to develop a sport diplomacy strategy based on Article 165(3) although the competence is limited to actions that support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States (Article 6 TFEU). Article 165(4) specifically excludes the adoption of harmonizing measures. The use of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), as deployed in EU cultural diplomacy, resolves the legislative competence question. The limitations of Article 165 mean that Member States retain primary responsibility for sport policy. EU action in the area of sport diplomacy therefore risks conflicting with national sport diplomacy strategies. For an EU sport diplomacy strategy to find favour within the political stream, it needs to stress the added value and complementarity of EU action. Many EU Member States already have long-standing ties with third countries and are able to channel national sport diplomacy programmes through the EEAS, the EU...
delegations, national embassies and cultural institutes. Greater EU co-ordination of these activities can promote common values and help secure better implementation through efficiencies.

The New Policy Is Cross-Cutting in Nature and Can Assist with Policy Implementation in Existing Areas

In recognition that cultural diplomacy can facilitate the attainment of foreign policy goals, the Joint Communication ‘Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations’ was adopted in the same month as the Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (June 2016). In November 2016, the Council Conclusions on Sport Diplomacy were published highlighting the equally cross-cutting dimension of the issue and its connection with the DG for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) and the DG for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR). To be developed within the political stream, so called ‘third tier’ competences such as sport need to be located within the EU’s broader competence architecture.

The New Policy Area Engages Existing Frameworks and Financing Instruments

For action to be taken in the political stream, the implementation of an EU sport diplomacy strategy must make use of existing institutions, such as the EEAS and EU Delegations, and through existing frameworks such the integration of sport into the EU’s Accession, Association, Cooperation and Neighbourhood agreements. Often, the most challenging aspect of agreeing new policy areas is the question of budgetary appropriations. EU sport diplomacy must take advantage of existing budgets, such as EU external relations funding and the Erasmus+ programme, even though some amendments to this programme were required to facilitate participation of third countries. Indeed, further technical adjustments might be required to further strengthen the participation of key third states, such as their integration into the Erasmus+ programme as Programme Countries rather than Partner Countries.

New Innovations in Policy Are Based on Existing Principles

Although new policy areas emerge based on existing frameworks and instruments, new policy innovations are inevitable. These are more likely to be approved within the political stream if innovations are based on existing principles. Two new innovations can be envisaged. The first is the establishment of a sport diplomacy co-ordinating body located within DG EAC. This body would assist with mainstreaming sport diplomacy across the range of EU competences, and it would also foster cooperation with relevant international organizations, such as the Council of Europe and the United Nations, and with national and international sports bodies. Second, the creation of a Sport Diplomacy Platform, or wider EU Public Diplomacy Platform, would assist with the implementation of sport diplomacy programmes in third states. The Platform would provide expertise, advice and, where necessary, training to EU institutions and Delegations. Both innovations are not major departures from existing EU practice. The Sport Unit located in DG EAC already plays a more general co-ordinating function, and the Platform would also be modelled on
existing principles, in this case the Cultural Diplomacy Platform which was established to
guide, support and advise EU institutions and EU Delegations on EU cultural diplomacy.

Conclusion

The EU is at the cusp of putting in place a new strategic venture – sport diplomacy. Sport has been identified as a little-known area of EU competence that can contribute to the implementation of the EU’s wider foreign policy goals whilst at the same time enhancing the status of sport within the EU’s institutional architecture. In deploying this diplomatic tool, the EU is catching up with a number of its global competitors who have already devised national strategies. The European Commission has been particularly prominent in setting the agenda. DG EAC has softened up the policy and politics streams through expert endorsement with sport diplomacy now being debated and actioned within the political stream. The 2016 Slovak Conclusions and the prioritizing of sport diplomacy in two consecutive EU Work Plans for Sport has brought a formal strategy a step closer.

However, drawing on Kingdon’s concept of spillover, it is argued that for this strategy to be approved, a number of conditions must be met. First, developing a sport diplomacy strategy should not raise competence issues and risk duplicating and conflicting with national strategies. Second, it must be cross-cutting in nature and able to assist with policy implementation in existing areas of EU competence. Third, the strategy must engage existing frameworks and financing instruments. Finally, any new policy innovations connected to the strategy must be based on existing principles drawn from more established policy areas and practice.

The opening of adjacent policy windows in EU foreign and cultural policies offers an opportunity for a sport diplomacy strategy to be adopted. However, should policy entrepreneurs frame proposals in a manner inconsistent with the above four requirements, the political stream will resist, the window close, and the opportunity lost for the EU to deploy this tool of its soft power armoury.

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