Remaking Public Service for Commercial Consumption: *Jamie’s School Dinners* Come to America

Helen Thornham and Elke Weissmann

*Jamie’s School Dinners* (2005) has been credited with starting a campaign that influenced school food policy. As an output of Channel 4, a celebrity vehicle and an example of the Lifestyle genre, *Jamie’s School Dinners* offers a pertinent case study to address the meaning of public service television in a global context. In addition to elucidating a number of contemporary issues around the status and meaning of public service principles in an increasingly international market, it also speaks to notions of genre, address, policy and celebrity that have emerged as underpinning facets of popular culture. In what follows, we trace a number of these tensions, uncovering the program’s address through textual analysis, and locating it within the broader histories of public service broadcasting and the Lifestyle genre.

*Jamie’s School Dinners* could be claimed by Channel 4 to be part of its public service remit, informing, educating and entertaining its audience. Like most of Channel 4’s output, the series was produced by an independent production company (in this case, Fresh One Productions, owned by Oliver) and created as a product for international exploitation. The series was remade in the US as *Jamie’s (American) Food Revolution* (ABC, 2010-11), where its emphasis on public service sat less comfortably, largely as a result of the specific US context. Here, it was classed as reality TV rather than as documentary and was clearly commercial in nature, being re-commissioned for a second season (even if it was dropped before all episodes were shown). The commercial nature of the program was doubly apparent when it was re-imported to the UK. Here, the US transformation undermined many of the public service values of the original series. This process highlights a significant problem for public service broadcasters across the globe: as receipts from licence fees and advertising are dwindling due to channel proliferation, audience fragmentation, and the widespread acceptance of neoliberalism as common sense ideology, broadcasters and producers alike are increasingly dependent on the international exploitation of their content. The UK independent market has been particularly successful in this respect in relation to the format trade. However, this sits uneasily with the broadcaster’s public service commitments, particularly when the programs are more political in nature. More importantly for us, it indicates that “the public” is still defined along national lines despite the increased internationalisation of both the television market and public policy.

Public Service Broadcasting in the UK

British broadcasting has operated within the system of public service practically since its inception in the early 1920s. The BBC, for example, initially set up as a private company, soon moved into the public sector. This process, which included reports from two committees, also defined the parameters of public service broadcasting. Indeed, the earliest definition, offered by the Sykes Committee in advance of the Crawford Committee (1925), proclaimed that broadcasting should be a public utility and serve the public interest. John Reith, invited to contribute to the Crawford Committee, extended this notion, arguing that broadcasting should not only “educate, inform and entertain”, but that it could – and should –make
Such an image emerged from the recognition of class divisions in British society, which a mixed program could be scheduled to breach. Consequently, schedules were designed with two aims in mind: to share culture and interests of different sections of society through an inclusive approach that was designed with an emphasis on showcasing the best of human knowledge; and to bring important elements of British social and political life to the airwaves so that people who had traditionally been excluded (due to class, gender or location, for example) were included. As Scannell convincingly argues, this defined a general (national) public for the first time in British history.

When we compare this history with the US, which opted for a commercial system, a further issue becomes apparent. Michele Hilmes highlights that notions of the “public good” were also featured in discourses about broadcasting in the US where it meant something decidedly different. There, “public good” was initially understood as an opportunity for organisations to directly partake in the broadcast. The emphasis was on the ability to speak via the creation and dissemination of content rather than (as with the UK) the ability to access broadcasted content. This crucial difference, which emphasised a plurality of voices in terms of control over spectrum (US) rather than in terms of varied content (UK) goes some way to explaining not only the differences in contemporary broadcasting, but also mode of address within programs. Indeed, the embedded assumption that variety of producers (rather than varied content) automatically caters for a diverse population works to construct the audience and the public in particular ways: not only is the audience/public constructed as more enterprising in spirit, but this enterprise is written along liberal, business driven models that, arguably, defines American public life more generally. In contrast, the British version of “the public good” assumes the need for a paternalistic role of the (upper middle-class led) state, which knows what is best for the nation as a whole. The comparison with the US thus reveals that the BBC constructed the audience in ways that suggested their inherent passivity and separation from the broadcaster. In turn, the British broadcaster is the active benefactor that designs its schedule to offer deliberate variety of high and low cultural elements enjoyed by different sections of the audience. The public, then, is perceived as receiving – as consumers - even if that is of material for public consumption.

Such a definition of the British public as receiving rather than participating in broadcasting remained central for the best part of 70 years, even as “the public” and “public service broadcasting” were continuously redefined. While we don’t have the scope to enter into a detailed history, one crucial redefinition is worth noting. This relates to changes brought into the system as a result of the 1986 Peacock Report. As Scannell details, the Report took an alternative approach to broadcasting and in the process altered the language used to speak about broadcasting for the foreseeable future. Where previous reports had thought of broadcasting as a utility and public service, Peacock saw in it a commercial entity. In this process, he also re-defined audiences from a national public to private consumers which meant that broadcasting in the UK should become more focused on the individual and that broadcasting itself should move away from providing a service to becoming a commodity. As several writers have argued, this resulted in the wholesale commercialisation of British television, where public service broadcasting was an optional add-on, reduced in definition to specific programs. As Holland argues, this undermined the construction of public service broadcasting as a system, which recognised viewers and listeners as citizens coming together as national, regional, or other specific,
publics. In other words, Peacock’s recommendations were largely in line with the neoliberal ideology Margaret Thatcher’s and later governments embraced, where the emphasis was on the positive impact of the market and the “active” consumers-as-individuals.

A further change worth noting was the increased introduction of digital technologies to broadcasting, which also facilitated a redefinition of the public. These technologies were understood to provide audiences with greater access to two-way communication, and hence would enable them to shape broadcast content themselves. This is particularly evident in the policy decisions taken by the Blair Government, which aimed to use these technologies to “ameliorate the ‘digital divide’ as a means of combating social exclusion and political apathy”. While the audience’s ability to shape broadcast content had been part of public service broadcasting long before the Blair Government, the 1990s saw concerted efforts, particularly by the BBC and Channel 4, to involve audiences in the making of programs, as the BBC’s ambitious Video Nation project (in different formats, since 1993) indicated. This participatory approach, also evident in Channel 4’s 4 Thought series, redefines the public in much more traditional ways as participating in a Habermasian public sphere and in so doing re-erows a masculine-defined sphere of politics while undermining other aspects of the public that broadcasting in the UK, particularly in its early forms on the BBC and later on Channel 4, had explicitly included.

Public service broadcasting in Britain, then, had been transformed significantly by the early 2000s. By then, it was clear that it was no longer a public utility, meant to be accessible by all, bringing the nation together as a general public. Rather, the national public, if it still existed, was now understood to consist of consuming individuals who might participate – if that was their choice, to use another neoliberal watchword – in a masculine-defined public sphere of politics and social policy. The need to engage with each other’s culture, to be educated and informed, to be represented in diverse ways, and most importantly to be brought together as one was increasingly perceived as archaic.

Channel 4 and Lifestyle Programming

Choice, the individual, and consumerism are some of the key underlying ideologies of contemporary broadcasting, written not only into scheduling and the availability of different channels, but also into the modes of address, and the discourses and representation of key characters of the programs themselves. Indeed, it is clear when we consider the wider socioeconomic and political contexts that these ideologies have been central not just to broadcasting, but also to popular culture, politics, civic life, and the economy more generally. As Angela McRobbie has argued, drawing on Giddens and Beck, neoliberal consumerist identities are part of a longer and wider shift working to construct the individual as discerning, self-monitoring agent.

In relation to broadcast content, our suggestion is that the Lifestyle genre and the 8pm slot for Channel 4’s schedule can be read as exemplary of these ideologies, and it is in their wider context that Jamie’s School Dinners is located. In what follows, we discuss the generic traits of the Lifestyle genre, particularly in relation to the ideologies of individualism, neoliberalism and choice, before specifically focusing on
Jamie’s School Dinners, which, by comparison with its contemporaries, claimed, at least overtly, to be more than the others.

Lifestyle has become a central feature for the evening line-up of Channel 4. It attracts a young middle-class audience which, as a result of its particular make-up (of reasonably affluent, cultured/educated, independent consumers), returns significant advertising revenue for the channel. Following early successes in the 1990s, Lifestyle is now a hallmark of the 8-9pm slot on weekdays for Channel 4, where it is a lucrative genre also for the production companies that produce and subsequently franchise their formats for sales across the world.

Despite its contemporary status in a prime time slot, the Lifestyle genre has a longer history - one that saw it originally as a predominantly daytime, female-oriented genre, aimed at housewives and mothers. Since 1990, however, the genre has undergone some changes, the most obvious being the shift from daytime to evening scheduling, which has necessitated further alterations in relation to content, mode of address and style. Charlotte Brunsdon and Rachel Moseley have both discussed these changes in relation to gender, and it is worth noting these briefly here. For Brunsdon, the change in scheduling is seen as an overall feminisation of British television in that period because on a broad level, genres perceived as feminine were now being seen in the evening slot, which was previously dominated by genres traditionally considered masculine (documentary and political chat shows) or aimed at the whole family (variety programs). Moseley has suggested, on the other hand, that the alteration in scheduling resulted in a “masculinisation” of the genre which has worked to establish it as “gender-neutral” over the past two decades. This process, of course, is built on the notion that the Lifestyle genre in its original form was problematic for the coveted demographic described above. The consequence, we suggest in keeping with Moseley, was a convoluted and complex process of “masculinisation” that has actually worked to promote ideologies of neoliberalism, individualism and capitalism as the shared cross-gender cultural values. What is notable from Moseley and Brunsdon’s analysis is the interrelation of content and time-slot when thinking about gender and gendered address.

The masculine address was overtly achieved by including an increasing array of bloke-y characters such as “Handy” Andy Kane, the carpenter on Changing Rooms (BBC 1996-2004), Gordon Ramsay who gained notoriety for his swearing, or indeed the “new lad” Jamie Oliver. Such characters also work as celebrities – unique individuals who are constructed as such (rather than, for example, as characters), which, in turn, underpins notions of individualisation, celebrity and neoliberalism, not least because in many cases, the centring of such characters also enhanced their careers. In addition, there was an increased emphasis on elements traditionally considered masculine, particularly the notion of competition, evident in Masterchef (BBC, since 1990) or Changing Rooms and utilised in Hell’s Kitchen (2005), and Sarah Beeny’s Selling Houses (More4, since 2012). Moreover, these programs included the notion of self-improvement as a central driving force behind participation. This notion, as theorists have argued, is connected to a discourse that emphasises a middle-class sensibility and is directed at the neoliberal individual in control of “his” own destiny via the avenue of consumption. In other words, these programs relied on an address to a subject that looked increasingly like a (metrosexual) spin on the traditional Cartesian (masculine) subject.
Channel 4’s Lifestyle programs further underwent a shift in the late 2000s. In the light of a review of public service broadcasting under the late Blair Government, Channel 4 sought to redress its role as public service provider. It had become overly commercial as a result of gaining control of its own advertising time in 1993, and because it refocused its main target group towards a young, affluent and urban audience with programs such as *Big Brother*. By 2009 it also became clear that it needed to find alternative revenue streams as audiences splintered in the multi-channel era. Channel 4 saw the review as an opportunity to increase public service programs, which included quality drama, but also documentary. Within this climate, Channel 4 also remodelled many of its Lifestyle programs to fit the more caring, and clearly educational mould it aimed to achieve as a whole. These included programs such as *How to Look Good Naked* (Channel 4, 2006-2008), which emphasised body consciousness as a socio-cultural issue, rather than constructing it as a matter of “bad taste” as with *What Not to Wear* (BBC, 2001-2007). *Supersize versus Superskinny* (Channel 4, since 2008) investigates the medical and socio-psychological issues that accompany dietary choices. *Superscrimpers* (Channel 4, since 2011) is constructed in response to the financial crisis of 2007/8, by offering domestic and local money saving advice. These contemporary Lifestyle programs can also be read as masculinised, not least because of the use of male experts who have replaced the female presenters of earlier versions of the genre (Gok Wan instead of Trinny and Susannah, Dr. Christian Jensen instead of Gillian McKeith). They also offer a particular appeal to the audience as both discerning and culturally or socially aware – offering a sort of public service Lifestyle genre, and in so doing re-imagining the public along lines of public policy and economics. It is within this context that *Jamie’s School Dinners* set a remarkable example.

*Jamie’s School Dinners*

*Jamie’s School Dinners* is at the forefront of this most recent shift in Channel 4’s broadcasting. Indeed, it clearly influenced and shaped the public service agenda that has been reimagined and reproduced in the particular ways noted above. These changes are also evident in the social and civic premise that the program pertains to have. Labelled “documentary” rather than Lifestyle, it re-imagines cooking as an issue of national importance related to health, wellbeing, education, and family values. It also re-positions cooking as an activity about which we need to be educated, rather than simply entertained. Of course, such claims also draw on the many discourses of youth as needing protection, as problematic, and as inherently different from previous generations. By focusing on children and school dinners, *Jamie’s School Dinners* works with the potent device of power imbalance which positions the viewer in a powerful role, which mirrors some of the earlier hierarchies discussed above even if they are here less clearly structured around class (though this features too as we will see later). Within this context, Oliver’s public persona is also deliberately re-written, from “new lad” and chef to caring father and citizen who acts as (literally) paternalistic individual.

In addition to the paternalistic stance of early public service broadcasting, the program also rehashes a deliberately national address. These are “our children” – the children of the nation – whom we are all called upon to care for, along with the campaign leader, Oliver. Moreover, it develops the educational content of the documentary into a political campaign, which the nation is called upon to join (for
example, by “taking action” via an online petition which resulted in over 270,000 signatures).\textsuperscript{34} As viewers, we are also offered characters with whom to identify, be that the school dinner cook and reluctant campaigner, Nora Sands, or (more likely) the parents who are shown again and again being addressed by Oliver in his crusade to find potential political allies. Eventually, this campaign, which we see unfold over four weeks, leads Oliver to the prime minister, where Oliver delivers the votes of the online petition. Of course, this understanding of “our children” and the viewer as citizen is based on an extremely porous premise. The assumption is that this is an issue in which everyone has some investment - even if we need to be educated about what exactly is happening in “our” schools to be able to create change in terms of policy and perception.

Despite these overt political and civic elements of the program, it nevertheless operates within the Lifestyle genre and its neoliberal agenda. This is perhaps most apparent in the way Nora is presented. Like any other subject of Lifestyle television, she is as a woman in need of a makeover. In this case, this makeover relates to her attitudes towards freshly cooked dinners. Accustomed to re-heating pre-cooked and packaged food, Nora is at first reluctant to embrace Oliver’s fresh food campaign. Instead, she complains about the amount of time and work the preparations take, and again when she doesn’t receive the recipes in writing but is instead expected to write them down herself. She whines when she doesn’t know what she will cook the next day. It is only later, when she convinces other dinner ladies, that her “progress” is revealed. Her attitudes to fresh food, as well as her white cooking uniform which includes an unflattering hat (a uniform she is allowed to take off when she joins the campaign trail) and her noticeable regional accent, clearly mark her as different from the middle-class celebrity cook, Oliver. Instead she is strongly coded as working class in need of improvement. In that respect, she is aligned with the parents who pass banned junk food to their children through the school fences. This representation invites the audience to position themselves as middle class, discerning and knowledgeable, a position which, as commentators\textsuperscript{35} have shown, is squarely in line with one key convention of Lifestyle television. Indeed, Biressi and Nunn argue that makeover programs allow viewers “to explore the hierarchies of social difference and to review their own relative position within them”.\textsuperscript{36} In this context, then, the viewers are again framed as neoliberal subjects, in charge of their own destinies. The main difference of course, relates to the overt political and civic messages the program also claims.

\textit{Jamie’s School Dinners}, then, precisely articulates a public which is both defined by traditional \textit{and} contemporary understandings of public service broadcasting. It marries the paternalistic and classist approach which imagines the viewing public as one nation with the “post-1980s ascendancy of the political values of consumerism, choice and individual self-reliance”.\textsuperscript{37} The public sphere becomes defined by the citizens’ ability to take control and participate – as long as they can firstly transform themselves to adhere to the middle-class values that are presented as commonsensical.

\textbf{The American Remake}
The problematic definition of the public in *Jamie’s School Dinners* is further undermined when it is compared with the American remake. Before we can investigate the re-import’s impact on the meanings of the original, it is important to gain a better understanding of the American version. *Jamie’s American Food Revolution*, in contrast to the British version, is not addressed to a nation as a whole. Instead, it is focused on specific individuals and a particular locale. The latter is evident in the opening lines spoken by Ryan Seacrest: “beautiful Huntington, West Virginia, population fifty thousand, home of Marshall University, and recently named – the unhealthiest city in America.” This address is accompanied by images of the city’s sights, including a “welcome to Huntington” sign, the University, the city centre, before cutting to images of unhealthy food, obese people on the streets and in doctors’ surgeries: images which we will encounter again later in the program when they will be contextualised in small-scale narratives about specific individuals. To compare this briefly with *Jamie’s School Dinners*, in the original series, Oliver appears in an educational environment, pictured showing children different vegetables before sitting amongst them while they eat their lunches. He addresses the camera directly, with the sound of the school environment nearly drowning him out, suggesting a direct cinema documentary style. When the sound is faded out and Timothy Spall begins his narration, the emphasis is on “school dinners” and again “our children”, indicating that this is a general problem that the nation as a whole has to deal with, rather than a specific town.

*Jamie’s American Food Revolution* is also about specific people – not least Oliver himself. He is introduced as the “one man [who] will be trying to save 50,000 lives.” In contrast, in the British version, he appears as someone who tries to take on the role of government, since “they don’t seem to have the answers.” This sets up two very different personas for Oliver. In the American version, he appears as single-handed saviour who is on a near-impossible mission; in the British, he is a concerned citizen and father doing his civic duty. The opening of the American version also introduces what Seacrest calls “resistance”, embodied in the two very specific figures of the radio DJ and one outspoken dinner lady, Alice, a more extreme version of Nora, clearly set up to mirror her. More importantly, in the British version Nora is representative of a general, and noticeably plural “dinner ladies” although she does visually dominate the introductory scenes. In the American version, Alice is constructed as an individual problem – as part of the “resistance”. As a result of this individualisation, the public and civic framework falters and the overt political aim becomes negated, and – considering the apparent scale of the mission – also less possible.

How individualised this mission actually is becomes apparent in the very first scene after the introductory section. Here, the local radio DJ, Rod Willis, states in the language of liberal America: “I really take issue with someone coming in and telling us how we should live our lives.” The argument of individual responsibility versus Oliver’s (and Britain’s more general) paternalistic stance is staged in the radio debate and post-interviews, when Willis accuses Oliver of grandee-ism. Of course this mirrors an age-old discourse of cultural difference between the two countries that is problematic at best. By staging this opposition as a fight (heated up in the post-debate interviews with Willis and Oliver), the program aims not only to create the suitable tension to keep viewers entertained (and note the absence of this extreme staging in the British version), but places the viewers in a position where they have to
choose clearly defined sides – with the aim, of course, that they will be swayed – as Willis will be – towards Oliver’s.

In sum, such a staging of oppositions, locales and individuals means that Oliver’s paternalistic campaign can be cloaked in the guise of neoliberal choice. The US program presents choices and perspectives constructed as dichotomous for the individual viewer. In turn, this means that the program is completely divorced from a collective address that defines groups of people (such as dinner ladies, parents, policy makers and finally the audience as a whole), from which policy and thereby a definition of the public as the nation can be extrapolated. Instead, even the viewers are defined as individuals, free to choose (and invited to choose). In order to make the argument compelling, the program also needs to develop Oliver’s and the other characters as characters. Their behaviour becomes stereotyped and – with the help of carefully crafted editing and decisions on the part of the participants, particularly Oliver, Alice and Willis – their behaviour also becomes performative. Oliver renders this visible by frequently emphasising that he is performing a role – be that of the apprentice on his first day in the school, of the “polite Brit” who comes to America, or the concerned father who dresses up in a pea costume to make his teachings to the kids more fun.40 The program, then, is not a civic call to action, as the British one claimed, but a showcasing of Oliver’s variable (star) persona as well as the creation of new stars (in particular Alice) in the name of neoliberal debate, conducted for the entertainment of (perhaps) politically aware, individual viewers.

Conclusions

What is particularly notable for us is that the differences between the British and American version only become visible through the re-import of the program to Channel 4. Sitting between similar Lifestyle programs, the re-import draws attention to the problematic framing of the original “documentary” and in the process, undermines its public service function more generally. In particular, it makes visible the contradictions, discussed below, that are heightened in the American remake, but contained in the British version too.

Oliver’s performance is self-consciously and self-reflexively foregrounded in the American remake, which in turn throws into question the authenticity of Oliver’s “passion” in the British original. By comparison, Oliver comes across as relatively understated, but the narrative in both versions is so similar that his emotional reactions are betrayed as narratively motivated and hence inevitably performed. As a result, a level of fakery creeps into the experience of the original version which undermines its value as public service. Public service, then, must be authentic, non-replicable or, at least, not performing.

The re-import to Britain, on a much more fundamental level, also makes visible its commercial value. Rather than being a campaign designed to change the national public, the series becomes a commodity, to be traded for financial gain. That British programs are internationally successful as formats is not news to a British viewing public.41 However, the commercial exploitation emphasises the monetary value of the program, there to enhance Oliver’s business empire, which by 2005 included a restaurant,
TV series, books and advertising contracts. This is also related to the notion of authenticity, raising issues around notions of “unique” television versus the “mass produced” – which the commercial exploitation via the format trade explicitly introduces.

The program’s international value also undermines its specific national public service value. If we are addressed as a nation, how can the exact same issue be of relevance to just one locale elsewhere? What this question suggests is that for public service television to work, it must indeed speak to a particular public and not – at the same time – to others. In the case of Jamie’s School Dinners this public was, as we have seen, very clearly defined as national.

As a result of the above, the series also becomes less issue based. Within the British context, the porosity of the school dinner narrative in which supposedly everyone is invested (be that for nostalgic or parental or public policy reasons) becomes increasingly obvious. Because everyone can engage with the narrative, it seems self-sufficient when seen only in the British context. But as soon as the American version is played back to us, this sentiment is lost as we gape at the bizarre American eating habits and political opinions, and because we are constantly aligned with individuals rather than publics. As a result, the narrative in both versions becomes less about the issues and more about the hero Jamie Oliver.

Overall, then, the re-import of the program highlights the fact that our own versions are actually far less issue based, less public service focused, less authentic, more hero centred and more commercially interested than we would like to admit. In part this stems from the normative viewing conditions that structure our reception and make these issues less visible for us. However, they are also better disguised in a British context that wants to operate as a public service. Seeing the American remake, then, creates the critical distance that uncloaks both the representational disguises and our normative perceptual habits.

This, of course, also has implications for our understanding of public service and the public more generally. Indeed, it unmasks the hidden and complex notion that we have of public service broadcasting. Thus, unlike Scannell who was able to return to broadcasting reports that clearly defined what the term should imply, we are struck by just how intangible the concept has become. The contradictions that the remake of the program makes visible suggest that public service broadcasting should be addressed to a specific public (and only to that), should be authentic (but what in an era of postmodern performativity might that be?), should not be commercial (but perhaps it can be in Britain), and should be issue based (but who defines what counts as an issue?). Perhaps even less tangible is the fact that it should be connected to a particular address (that draws us in as citizens who might be able to take “action”) and to a particular, but badly defined, experience of viewing. What all of this indicates is that the notion of “the public” is emotive, and a lived and embodied experience which, for British viewers, decreasingly operates as a clear agenda.

Jamie’s School Dinners and its American remake, then, make visible the problem that public service broadcasting in the post-Peacock era faces. If it is defined by particular programs, such as this one which we have dubbed an example of public service Lifestyle, then it suffers from a lack of clear
understandings of its component parts, and most of all “the public” itself. As long as it remains an emotive notion that needs to operate within a commercial system (in which programs need to be exploited via the format trade, for example), it can all too easily be unmasked as performed, inauthentic, not issue based and, most of all, not really addressed to us – the viewing nation as public. With this specific (and last) bastion of public service broadcasting pulled from under us like the proverbial rug, the ideal of public service television turns into a falling house of cards.


5 Largely, this emphasis on broadcasting as a public utility stemmed from the recognition that wavelengths were scarce and hence needed to be tightly regulated in order to guarantee the quality of the service in the public interest.

6 Reith cited in Scannell, “Public Service Broadcasting”, 14. Of course, such a definition indicates a significant bias towards masculine-defined aspects of public, social and private life. However, as Scannell shows, the early definition of public service broadcasting explicitly addressed women as an important public that needed to be taken into consideration if the nation was to be brought together as one.


8 Scannell, “Public Service Broadcasting”, 16.

By the mid-1930s, however, the regulation of the American system concentrated ownership in elite hands - interestingly in the supposed interest of public service. As Hilmes highlights, this meant that public service became defined as the offerings of a station that was run as a business, whilst non-profit organisations were seen as propagandistic. Michele Hilmes, “British Quality, American Chaos” Radio Journal: International Studies in Broadcast and Audio Media, 1.1 (2003), 18.


Alan Peacock, Report of the Committee on Financing the BBC (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1986). Whilst earlier committees redefined public service broadcasting in relation to its aims and scope (for example the recognition that ethnic or gender minorities needed to be more expressly served in the Annan Committee 1974), the Peacock Report asked the much more fundamental question if public service broadcasting was a desired option.


Holland, “Conceptual Glue”.


Angela McRobbie, The Aftermath of Feminism: Gender, Culture and Social Change (London: Sage, 2009), 19

See “BARB Weekly Top Ten, week 19 March”, last updated 2013, http://www.barb.co.uk/viewing/weekly-top-10?_s=5&period[]=201305060119.


Johnson and Wheatley: “The 8–9 Slot”.


For a feminist critique of the Cartesian subject as masculine see Adrianna M. Paliyenko, “Postmodern Turns against the Cartesian Subject: Descartes ‘I’, Lacan’s ‘Other’”, in Feminist Interpretations of René Descartes, ed. Susan Bordo (Pennsylvania Press 1999), pp. 141-166.


Palmer, “‘The New You’”; Biressi and Nunn, “Bad Citizens”.

Biressi and Nunn, “Bad Citizens”, 15.

Ibid. 16.

And we encounter the same argument again in an interview with Alice Glue.

40 However, he also keeps emphasising that this is “real”, particularly when one disenchanted participant points out that “this is TV”. The effect of this continuous need to stress the reality of the series, the people and his motives, is of course that we are reminded that it might actually not be.

41 One of the most successful British films of the mid-2000s was *Slumdog Millionaire* (Danny Boyle, 2008), which is based on the premise of the Indian remake of *Who Wants to Be a Millionaire* (ITV, since 1998).