Market discipline and EU corporate governance reform in the banking sector: Merits, fallacies, and cognitive boundaries

Emilios Avgouleas, Jay Cullen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (journal)peer-review

26 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Much contemporary analysis has concluded that the recent financial crisis and bank failures were, among other things, the result of a breakdown in corporate governance regimes and market discipline. In this context, new regulations advocate such market-based remedies as tighter investor monitoring and greater control over executives' remuneration, in order to safeguard financial stability. We argue that this approach largely ignores three very important aspects of modern financial markets that cannot be constrained through market discipline: (i) socio-psychological phenomena; (ii) the epistemological properties of financial market innovation; and (iii) the inherent inability of market participants to predict uncertain risk correlations. Therefore, this article argues that excessive EU focus on corporate governance reforms as a means to improve financial stability detracts attention from much more significant concerns, chiefly, the issue of optimal bank structure.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)28-50
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of Law and Society
Volume41
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 31 Mar 2014
Externally publishedYes

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