Hans Kelsen’s Concept of Normative Imputation

Peter Langford, Ian Bryan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (journal)peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)


This article compares and contrasts Hans Kelsen's concept of normative imputation, in the Lecture Course of 1926, with the concepts of peripheral and central imputation, in The Pure Theory of Law of 1934. In this process, a wider and more significant distinction is revealed within the development of Hans Kelsen's theory of positive law. This distinction represents a shift in Kelsen's philosophical allegiance from the Neo-Kantianism of Windelband to that of Cohen. This, in turn, reflects a broader disengagement of The Pure Theory of Law from the more direct connection with a political project of a civitas maxima envisaged by the Lecture Course.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)85-110
JournalRatio Juris
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2013


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